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Abstract: This paper charts the shifts in Polish nationality policy in the pe-
riod since 1944. The first part focuses on the ways the PPR (Polish Workers’ 
Party) and later the PZPR (Polish United Workers’ Party) pursued national ho-
mogeneity through population transfer, programmes of ‘Polonisation’ and as-
similation, in the broader context of post-war and Cold War geopolitics, as well 
as recurring legitimacy crises. The second part of the paper discusses the lim-
its to postsocialist ‘multicultural’ policy and practice by calling attention to the 
new logics of cultural homogenisation dominant under contemporary neo-lib-
eralism. The paper discusses the relationship between changing values and the 
management of social anger in order to explain the contemporary cartographies 
of privileged / marginalised cultural communities and practices. Through an ex-
ploration of the logics of cultural homogenisation, the paper highlights: a. the 
particularities of the Polish case, b. the specificity of postsocialism and c. the 
manner in which the Polish experience relates to, and parallels, processes of 
cultural homogenisation elsewhere.
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Resumen: Este artículo recorre los cambios en la política de nacionalidad 
polaca desde 1944. La primera parte se centra en las maneras en que el PPR 
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(Partido de los Trabajadores Polaco) y después el PZPR (Partido de los Traba-
jadores Unidos Polaco) persiguieron la homogeneización nacional a través de 
transferencias de población, programas de «polonización» y asimilación, en el 
contexto amplio de la geopolítica de posguerra y Guerra Fría y de repetidas cri-
sis de legitimidad. La segunda parte trata los límites de la política multicultu-
ral postsocialista para llamar la atención sobre nuevas lógicas de homogeneiza-
ción cultural bajo el neoliberalismo reciente. El artículo plantea la relación entre 
cambio de valores y gestión de la ira social para explicar las cartografías con-
temporáneas de comunidades y prácticas culturales privilegiadas/marginadas. A 
través de la exploración de las lógicas de la homogeneización cultural el artículo 
incide en a) las particularidades del caso polaco, b) la especificidad del postco-
munismo y c) la manera en que la experiencia polaca se relaciona con otros pro-
cesos de homogenización cultural.
Palabras clave: Homogeneización cultural, nacionalidad, Polonia, siglo XX.
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Introduction
In this paper I wish to compare and contrast the processes of cultural 
homogenisation in socialist and postsocialist Poland in order to better 
understand the Polish case and highlight parallels and connections with 
other places. I also hope to isolate processes that transcend the state’s 
boundaries and that are operative at the local, regional and global scales. 
A goal of cultural homogenisation, according to Conversi (2010:720), 
‘has often been to seek congruence between ethnic and political bounda-
ries; that is, to forge cohesive, unified communities of citizens under gov-
ernmental control’. And while homogenisation is a socio/political process, 
the assumed endpoint, homogeneity, as Conversi (2010:720) notes, is an 
ideological construct. The policies put in place to achieve such homoge-
neity have ranged from cultural homogenisation, in the sense of the state 
fostering greater homogeneity within its territory by encouraging / requir-
ing assimilation to hegemonic norms through the standardisation of lin-
guistic practices, universal education, military conscription, discourses of 
nationalism, amongst others; to the practice of ethnic cleansing whereby 
those deemed outside the conceived boundaries of ethnicity or nation are 
physically removed and, at the extreme, genocide, where non-members 
of a particular nation / ethnicity are physically liquidated. For Conversi 
(2007:388), ‘[c]ultural homogenisation is largely a subtractive process, 
involving the negation of the existence of separate groups, cultures, be-
liefs, languages, traditions and ideas within the same polity’, indicating 
that any analysis of cultural homogenisation requires the examination of 
the mechanism(s) of subtraction.
However, it is important to note that the pursuit of homogeneity in it-
self is not always the primary aim of homogenisation policy. Other goals, 
such as greater economic efficiency, greater state control over a territory, 
increased ease of governance and power over the citizenry play important 
roles. In addition, as Ugur Ümit Üngör (2011:7) has recently argued, ‘the 
dynamic of the state system’ as constituted by nation-states ‘is towards 
more homogenization’. This homogenising drift, unplanned, and pro-
duced dialectically between the general population and the political elite 
in the face of modernity’s challenges (including increased speed of com-
munication, changing divisions of labour, new relations of social produc-
tion and reproduction) form an important backdrop to understanding the 
homogenisation policies articulated by political elites as they attempt to 
shape the present and the future. Üngör’s (2011) reiteration of the connec-
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tion between modernity (in particular, the development of the modern na-
tion state and inter-state competition) and the pursuit of homogenisation 
is timely and his case study has many parallels with the historic experi-
ence of twentieth century East-Central Europe in general and Poland in 
particular.
But before exploring the varied methods of seeking cultural homoge-
nisation in socialist and postsocialist Poland it is important to recognise a 
fundamental difference in the way in which governance and power in so-
cialist countries and liberal democratic ones are apprehended by the popu-
lace. David Ost (2005) has recently argued that, since the party in social-
ist society (i.e. Communist Party) claims to control everything, power is 
transparent. Everyone knows that ultimately the party is responsible. In 
contrast, in liberal democratic societies power is opaque as the ‘invisible 
hand’ of the market makes it difficult to identify who, exactly, is responsi-
ble for social, political, economic and cultural difficulties and challenges. 
This has some important implications both for the management of social 
anger, which refers to the negative emotions that are created by every so-
cial system (Ost 2005, 21), and the manner in which cultural homogeni-
sation practices are actually manifested. As noted above, cultural homog-
enisation practices vary, but they can, in part, be seen as serving particular 
social goals: firstly, as Ernest Gellner (1983) noted, they often form con-
stituent elements of economic development (industrialisation) through, 
for example, mass compulsory education, and secondly, these practices 
help regulate and direct the social anger concomitant to the normal opera-
tion of the social system being discussed, in this case socialist and postso-
cialist systems respectively.
The key claim that I advance in this paper is that processes of cultural 
homogenisation can play an important role in sustaining the dominant so-
cial relations and organising the social anger regime that those social rela-
tions inevitably produce. As Ost (2005:21) notes, political authorities play 
a key role in defining ‘what feelings we are able to express and how’. 
Identifying the object (national, ethnic, class identities, for instance) of 
homogenising pressures therefore provides a guide to the functioning of a 
particular social system.
Recent scholarship on the socialist regimes of East-Central Europe 
has drawn attention to the nationalist policies and practices of the various 
communist parties of those states in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. Mevius (2005), for example, talks of ‘patriotic socialism’ in the re-
gion and argues that what may be described as the ethno-nationalism of 
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the various communist parties was an attempt to secure a modicum of le-
gitimacy from populations which frequently, and with good reason, saw 
the communists as ‘agents of Moscow’.
In Poland, Marcin Zaremba (2001) has highlighted the nationalism 
of the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR). Brubaker’s (1996) ‘nationalising na-
tionalism’ in the context of post-war East-Central Europe has been dis-
cussed and analysed from a range of perspectives. In addition, the differ-
ence between centrifugal and centripetal aspects of PPR nationality policy 
has been explored in order to highlight the manner in which homogenis-
ing policies and practice are intimately connected with the way governing 
elites (in this case the PPR) attempt to manage social anger and stabilise 
(regulate) society’s social relations (Fleming, 2010). ‘Patriotic social-
ism’ therefore should not simply be understood as a response of commu-
nist parties to establish some link with the population or to counter claims 
that the communists were emissaries of Moscow, rather ‘patriotic social-
ism’ was the key method by which social anger was managed in societies 
where that anger was automatically directed against the communist party 
since it claimed to control everything —from work and housing to trans-
port and leisure—. In short, ‘patriotic socialism’ has to be seen as a re-
sponse to the transparency of power, which not only affirmed the ethnic 
core population, but provided ‘legitimate’ targets for antipathy —mainly 
national and ethnic minorities—.
In contrast, in the postsocialist period, policies have been put in place 
in order to protect national minority communities. These have taken shape 
as the countries of East-Central Europe have joined institutions such as 
the Council of Europe, NATO, the EU, amongst others, which have em-
phasised that adherence to European ‘norms’ of tolerance is crucial. A 
new minority rights regime has been established in Europe as signalled by 
the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of Na-
tional Minorities (1995). In this new regime social anger has to be man-
aged, and exclusions explained and justified, by political and social lead-
ers and activists.
David Ost (2005:180), in the context of Poland, argues that Solidar-
ity activists through the 1990s supported the redirection of social anger at 
the decline in living conditions to symbolic and mythical figures such as 
‘communists, crypto-communists, liberals, non-believers, ‘foreigners’ (of-
ten defined as Poles who did not fit «Polish Catholic» norms), criminals, 
and other assorted «aliens»’. Throughout the postsocialist period the (re)
direction of social anger has been fairly complex, not only reproducing in 
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a new context the socialist practice of targeting minorities (for example, 
the phenomenon of antisemitism in the absence of a significant Jewish 
minority (Ambrosewicz-Jacobs and Orla-Bukowska, 1998)) and narrow-
ing the scope of Polish authenticity, but also reconfiguring values around 
lifestyle, work and class identities. Indeed, arguably, the current political 
opposition of the culturally conservative Law and Justice party and plural-
ist Civic Platform can be understood, at least in part, as a debate as to ex-
actly where social anger should be directed, which cultures require either 
homogenising to the mainstream or exclusion from the social / political 
body. As I will argue later, the two positions in this debate are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, but can be seen as complementary in that they 
both inhibit the expression of anger in an appropriate economic direction. 
The consequence is that the advancement of neoliberalisation is not chal-
lenged, even though neoliberal processes are fundamental to the structural 
formation of contemporary social anger.1
In the second part of this paper I will map out some of this complex-
ity, highlighting the very real limits of current ‘multiculturalism’ as proc-
esses of cultural homogenisation continue to operate, to regulate and to 
direct social anger. But first I consider processes of cultural homogenisa-
tion in the Polish People’s Republic.
Legitimating cultural homogenisation
Processes of cultural homogenisation in post-war Poland can be ap-
proached in several ways. Firstly, due weight has to be given to the post-
war context and the regional geo-political configuration; secondly, atten-
tion needs to be paid to the historical context which placed primacy on the 
formation of nation-states after the perceived failure of the League of Na-
tions minority rights regime; thirdly, awareness of the varying roles and 
goals of key actors in the country such as the Roman Catholic Church, as 
well as the Polish Workers’ Party is required; and fourthly, the actions and 
inactions of the population in Poland have to be considered.
1 Following Peck and Tickell (2003:168) neoliberalisation is here conceived as the 
‘mobilisation of state power in the contradictory extension and reproduction of market 
(-like) rule’
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Minorities as a problem
Through the second half of the Polish Second Republic national mi-
norities were increasingly conceived of as being problematic, a tendency 
accentuated by the increased influence of national democratic thinking 
within the polity. In 1934, for instance, Colonel Beck (Polish Foreign 
Minister) declared before the League of Nation’s assembly that ‘pending 
the introduction of a general and uniform system for the protection of mi-
norities my Government is compelled to refuse…all cooperation with in-
ternational organizations in the matter of supervision of the application 
by Poland of the system of minority protection’. In 1935, the small Com-
munist Party of Poland shifted its position on nationality issues to become 
less supportive of minorities, especially in relation to those in northern 
Poland and Silesia. This was due to the changing international climate, 
where it was politic for the party to distance itself from any German mi-
nority secessionist demands, as well as a desire to broaden the party’s ap-
peal in the fight against Fascism. However, where geopolitical demands 
were less pressing, vocal support for minorities was still expressed, such 
as in May 1936 at the Congress of Cultural Workers in multiethnic Lwów 
(Shore 2006:128). However, the shift in the general policy of the Commu-
nist Party was indicative of a more pronounced movement against minori-
ties in Poland that became increasingly evident as the 1930s wore on.
Toleration of minority populations collapsed during the war, as reports 
sent to the Polish Government in Exile in London by Jan Karski in 1940 
and Roman Knoll in 1943 indicate. In a January 1941 letter to Stanisław 
Kot, Prince Radziwill noted that the broadcast of the Polish Minister of 
Information, Stanisław Stroński, in which Stroński promised equal rights 
for Jews in post-war Poland ‘made a disastrous impression in Poland, 
even among the workmen belonging to the Polish Socialist Party’.2
At the international level, there was support from all the allies fight-
ing the Axis powers for the creation of homogeneous nation-states in 
East-Central Europe by 1944. There were no voices calling for the re-
establishment of the League of Nations’ regime of minority protection. 
Winston Churchill famously endorsed population expulsions from Poland 
once the war had been won in a speech to the House of Commons on 15th 
December 1944.
2 FO 371/26723 C278 (9th january 1941).
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Expulsion is the method which, so far as we have been able to see, 
will be the most satisfactory and lasting. There will be no mixture of 
populations to cause endless trouble...A clean sweep will be made.3
German minorities were conceived as being part of a fifth column 
easing Nazi conquest in East-Central Europe. The leader of the Polish 
Government in Exile, Władysław Sikorski, in 1942, further argued that 
transferring the German population would protect the State from fifth col-
umn activities and eliminate ‘from international relations the source of re-
curring friction due to the activities of German minorities’.4 Herbert Hoo-
ver (1942:315) maintained that population transfers could play a key role 
in stemming war in Europe, and population transfers were widely seen 
as part of a legitimate policy mix to enhance the homogeneity of nation-
states.
While the British and the Americans were largely concerned with the 
stability of the state system in Europe, Polish politicians were also cog-
nisant of social sentiment in Poland itself and sought both to create a 
stronger state and respond to society’s demand for increased national ho-
mogeneity.
Anti-minority sentiment was high in the aftermath of the war. Bela-
rusian and Jewish minorities were, for instance, popularly identified with 
communism, and the wider society drew on pre-war stereotypes promul-
gated by factions linked to National Democracy to marginalise these com-
munities. The British ambassador to Poland, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck’s 
note to London on 18th December 1945 highlights the anti-minority cli-
mate at that time: ‘[b]efore the war the Poles had on the whole been 
strongly anti-semitic…The Poles appear to me to be as anti-semitic as 
they were 25 years ago’ despite the fact that ‘[t]he Jewish population has 
decreased from 3,250,000 in 1939 to 80,000’5 This level of anti-minor-
ity sentiment thrived in an environment in which no significant institu-
tion, party or individual acted consistently to vigorously defend minori-
ties’ interests, or to explain the complexity of the historical conjuncture in 
a way that did not accuse minority communities of committing a range of 
harms against the conceived national core (i.e. Poles). Indeed, increased 
3 Hansard: House of Commons, 15 December 1944, pp. 1484.
4 See Siebel Achenbach (1994:34): This memorandum can be found at the National 
Archives at Kew. NA.FO 371/31091.
5 NA.FO 371 /57684 WR15.
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homogeneity was accepted across the political spectrum as a panacea for 
the trauma of six years of war and a way to inhibit future conflict, but the 
way to achieve this through population transfer, and border changes, in 
both the west and east was subject to much debate. The border issue and 
the Allied endorsement of the Curzon line as Poland’s eastern frontier ul-
timately led to the collapse of Mikołajczyk’s Polish Government in Exile 
in November 1944. Accepting the reality of the Curzon line, Mikołajczyk 
reasoned that:
Such a Poland [cropped in the east, compensated in the west] would 
undoubtedly have a hard existence, but the national substance pre-
served, with its demographic and great economic potential, nationally 
homogeneous, without minorities, is a foundation for a strong Poland in 
the future and a fairly acceptable place for the development of the na-
tion.6
The Soviet Union strongly endorsed national homogeneity and the 
congruence of nation with state borders in East-Central Europe. In rela-
tion to Poland it was, in part, a geo-political strategy to secure her east-
ern reaches. The USSR legitimated its invasion of Poland on 17th Septem-
ber 1939 by arguing, incorrectly, that eastern Poland was ethnographically 
dominated by non-Poles. In October 1939 rigged elections were staged, 
and delegates elected to the Assemblies of West Ukraine and West Bela-
rus called for incorporation into the USSR. The return of the Soviet Army 
to these areas in 1944 ‘returned’ them to the USSR. Almost immediately 
the Soviets initiated programmes of population transfer.
The Soviet nationalising vision was reflected in the creation of an ‘in-
itiative’ group in Moscow in 1941 at Stalin’s request. This initiative group 
was later to become the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) and from the very 
beginning it affirmed the priority of the Polish population vis à vis na-
tional minorities. For example, according to the minutes of this group, it 
did not call itself communist because of, amongst other reasons, the im-
perative ‘that the masses see in our party an organization linked with the 
Polish nation and its most vital interests and that our enemies will not be 
able to refer to us as agents of a foreign power’.7 The domination by the 
6 Quoted in Kersten (1991:113) and (1986:93). The point that Mikołajczyk makes is 
clear, despite the syntax of the despatch.
7 Quoted in Polonsky and Drukier (1980:128).
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PPR of the Polish Committee for National Liberation (PKWN) —the de 
facto provisional government in Poland during the autumn of 1944— al-
lowed transfer agreements to be signed between Poland and her Soviet 
neighbours. The Polish Government in Exile, based in London, was very 
concerned by these agreements, and Polish Foreign Minister Tadeusz 
Romer wrote to the British Government on 7th October 1944, arguing that 
those agreements ‘do not cover the repatriation of Polish citizens deported 
into the interior of Russia in 1939-1941 which seem to indicate that in 
this case the Soviet Government had a purely political effect in view’.8 He 
also expressed concern at the ‘unilateral decision to change the traditional 
ethnographical face of these territories by arbitrarily moving masses of 
millions of people.’
Population transfer / expulsions
Population transfer had been part of Soviet policy in the Polish lands 
from the beginning of the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland, with hun-
dreds of thousands of people from ‘suspicious’ classes and elites deported 
to the depths of the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941.9 The return 
of Soviet forces in 1944 saw population transfer introduced as the main 
mechanism to ensure national homogeneity in eastern Poland, western Be-
larus and Ukraine. On 9th September 1944, transfer agreements between 
Poland, Belarus and Ukraine were signed.10 These transfer agreements 
regulated a speedy transfer of populations to their respective nation-state 
lasting from 15th October 1944-15th February 1945. This tight timetable 
was soon recognised as overly ambitious —especially in the harsh condi-
tions of winter, and the transfer window was extended until June 1946—.
On 7th October 1944 the key institution which would organise and 
regulate the transfer process, the State Repatriation Office (PUR) was es-
tablished. Population transfer was, in theory, voluntary; in practice, coer-
cion was frequently used to encourage people of the ‘wrong’ nationality 
8 Letter from Polish Foreign Minister T. Romer to the British Government, 7 October 
1944. PISM A.11.49/Sow/6. Reprinted in DPSR vol. 2, number 235:400.
9 The generally accepted figure is 300,000. Sanford (2005:29).
10 The signatories were Edward Osóbka-Morawski (Poland), Panteleimon Po no ma-
ren ko (Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic) and Nikita Krushchev (Ukrainian Soviet So-
cialist Republic).
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to move. The only minority allowed to return to Poland were members of 
the Jewish minority.
In the final three months of 1945, 201,330 people were transported 
into Poland from the east, and 144,703 in the following three months.11 
Around 482,000 Ukrainians were removed from Poland in the period 
1945-1946 (Ther 2001:56). The Ukrainian transfers were marked by seri-
ous violence, with Soviet-backed forces clashing with underground Polish 
and Ukrainian soldiers. Research conducted by Subtelny (2001:164) 
shows part of the human cost of the operation, with 4,670 Ukrainians 
killed and 305 villages burnt.
After the end of the transfer programme in 1946, some 150,000 
Ukrainians remained in Poland. The Ukrainian SSR would not agree to 
extend the 15 June 1946 deadline for the completion of the transfers, nor 
would it provide transport. Those who remained in Poland were forcibly 
dispersed in 1947 from south-east Poland to the ‘Recovered Territories’ in 
the north under the rubric of ‘Operation Vistula’. A key objective of this 
operation was to divorce the Ukrainians from their traditional lands, prox-
imity and contact with the border and with each other in order to facili-
tate rapid assimilation. Significantly, the Ukrainians dispersed to the north 
were placed under the surveillance of the Security office (UB) and their 
requests to establish Orthodox churches were closely vetted and routinely 
rejected, whereas if the population was deemed to be Polish, permission 
was frequently granted.
In the West, the forced expulsion of Germans began almost imme-
diately after the allied victory in May 1945. The expulsion of Germans 
had the support, in principle, of the US, Britain and the USSR since the 
Tehran conference of 1943. In the region east of the Oder River, Polish 
Army units began a period of ‘wild expulsions’ from the area which the 
Polish State sought to incorporate. The actions of June and July 1945 al-
lowed the emerging Polish State to claim that the key western border ar-
eas were German-free, strengthening their claims that the Polish west-
ern border should run along the Oder. In late July and early August 1945 
the Potsdam conference regulated the expulsion process to be conducted 
in a ‘humane and orderly’ manner. The British agreed to take 1.5 mil-
lion Germans from Poland to its zone of occupation in Germany. It is 
estimated that in total over 7.4 million Germans fled or were expelled 
11 See Czerniakiewicz (1987:56).
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from former German territory in the east and from Poland (Nitschke 
2004:60).12
Significance and social meaning of the expulsions / transfers
The population transfers and expulsions of 1944-1947 together with 
the redrawing of state borders made Poland increasingly homogeneous. 
By 1950 minorities constituted a mere 3 percent of the population, com-
pared with around 35 percent in 1931 and 14 percent in 1946.13 Politicians 
both communist and from the Polish Government in Exile recognised that 
broad sections of the Polish population considered that national minorities 
simply did not belong in the country. The population transfer process al-
lowed the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) to demonstrate its Polish creden-
tials and alignment with Polish sentiment. At the same time, the transfer 
programme officially endorsed the view that some people had no right to 
be in Poland and had to leave. Those that remained were conceived as le-
gitimate targets for disdain and indeed violence. As a consequence, the 
PPR was able to direct social anger from itself to minority communities.
In addition, in both the east and west there remained the thorny issue 
of identifying who exactly was non-Polish and ascribing nationality to au-
tochthonic populations such as Silesians, Kashubians and Mazurians. For 
the Catholic writer Władysław Grabski, verification and ‘repolonisation’ 
programmes could
liberate the Slavic blood flowing in the veins of Germanised Silesians 
and Pomeranians ...disinfecting them and returning them to health by 
teaching them the native tongue in order to incorporate them back into 
the mother country, not as prodigal sons but as victims rescued from the 
ultimate outrage.14
12 The transfer of Germans was mandatory, but many Germans were incarcerated in 
labour camps in the immediate post-war period. In Upper Silesia there were 86 camps, and 
it is estimated that at least 60,000 people died in these camps (Borodziej 2000:11).
13 The 1950 census indicated that there were 50,000 Jews, 160,000 Belarusians, 
170,000 Germans, 150,000 Ukrainians and around 30,000 people from other minority 
groups including Lithuanians. These figures should be treated with caution, given the na-
tionality policy of the PZPR. See Eberhardt (2000:76).
14 Cited in Kulczycki (2001:207).
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In practice no universal ‘verification’ programme was initiated and lo-
cal leaders had a wide degree of discretion, with local authorities expel-
ling people in 1944 and 1945 whom the central government may have 
wanted to remain, including industrial workers and specialists —vital 
given the widespread labour shortages—. The difficultly, as Kulczycki 
(2001:209) notes, was that ‘Polish raison d’etat and the social consen-
sus demanded both the widest possible inclusion of German citizens of 
Polish origin and the strictest exclusion of all Germans.’ Thus, in deter-
mining the ‘foreignness’ of particular individuals, religion played a cru-
cial identifying role. Under the leadership of August Hlond, and later Ste-
fan Wyszyński, the ethno-religious policy of the Roman Catholic Church 
in Poland buttressed the State’s ethno-nationalist homogenising policies.
In did so in several ways. Firstly, Hlond removed German Catholic 
bishops from the ‘Recovered Territories’ (those areas formerly German), 
allowing the State to point to the presence of the Polish Church in those 
areas as evidence of their Polishness in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. Secondly, the Church encouraged the view that Catholicism was an 
integral part of Polishness. Non-Catholics were thereby marginalised and 
seen as non-Polish. As late as 1949, in Mazuria, local Catholic clergy con-
tinued to promote the view that ‘a Pole is a Catholic, an Evangelical is a 
kraut’ (Polak to katolik, a ewangelik to szwab).15 Greek-Catholics were 
patronised and, as Syrynk (2007:245) argues, the sentiment guiding many 
within the Roman Catholic Church was both related to the issue of nation-
ality (Pole versus Ukrainian) and to a sense of religious superiority as ex-
pressed in the Latin phrase: greca fides nulla fides (Greek belief is no be-
lief).
In relation to the Jewish population, the Catholic Church’s actions 
were particularly unhelpful. Not only did many priests openly express an-
tisemitic sentiment, but even Wyszyński, in the aftermath of the Kielce 
pogrom on 1946, seemed to give some credence to the myth of ritual mur-
der despite Pope Innocent IV’s 1247 papal bull declaring such accusa-
tion against Jews as false. Two weeks after the pogrom, Wyszyński in a 
conversation with a delegation of Jewish leaders suggested that ‘the mat-
ter of blood was not definitively settled’ (Gross, 2006:149). Overall, the 
Church provided restricted (and restricting) content to ‘Polishness’, which 
15 AAN PZPR 237 /VII / 2619 / 111 (point 3) Voivodship Committee of the PZPR in 
Olsztyn 6/11/1949.
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positioned non-Catholics outside the legitimate community. Since these 
groups were frequently the same people the State sought to transfer, and 
later assimilate, (Orthodox-Belarusians/Ukrainians, Protestants-Autoch-
thones) the Church was a key actor in furthering the State’s homogenising 
policies —policies which, as highlighted in the introduction, helped the 
PPR redirect social anger from itself to national minorities—.
The Church therefore played an important role in the organising of 
social anger, which allowed the PPR and later the PZPR to achieve and 
sustain hegemony. In short, by identifying non-Catholics as targets of 
disdain, the Roman Catholic Church gave the imprimatur of sanction 
for action by the populace against these people, and, counter to its own 
longer-term interests, supported the redirection of social anger to targets 
congruent with the needs of the State (PPR/ PZPR). The Catholic Church 
sought to consolidate its dominant ecclesiastical position in Poland by 
gaining from the rival Churches. For example in a 1945 letter to the vice-
voivod of the Silesia-Dąbrowskie voivodship, the Bishop of the Kato-
wice diocese called for the liquidation of the Augsburgian Church on the 
grounds of its anti-Polish orientation.16
The anti-Jewish proclamations of Roman Catholic Church clergy ef-
fectively organised social anger against Jews, the only minority which was 
not scheduled for population transfer. The PPR was therefore free to cau-
tiously condemn antisemitism, while doing relatively little to defend Jew-
ish communities from assault. These assaults and the wider unwelcoming 
climate helped fuel Jewish migration out of Poland, and thereby increase 
the homogeneity which the PPR/State sought. Szaynok (2004:193) has ar-
gued that PPR policy towards the Jews was conditional on its own strate-
gic needs. For example, outrages against Jews, in the immediate post-war 
period, could easily be blamed on sections of society loyal to the Polish 
Government in Exile in London. Such accusations were believable given 
that the issue of antisemitism had dogged that government in relation to 
its armed forces in Britain and in various theatres of war. In the battle for 
legitimacy, discrediting the Polish Government in Exile was an important 
objective of the PPR.
The PPR and the Church accentuated the Polish population’s low 
tolerance for minorities following the Second World War through their 
16 Urban 1994:73. AAN MAP 1057. Letters from Bishop Adamski to vice-voivod 
Ziętka 20th February and 27th March 1945.
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ethno-nationalist and ethno-religious policies respectively. Prestige and 
legitimacy was lent to the homogenising project by the West (Britain 
and the US in particular) through their endorsement of the expulsion of 
the Germans, and, in the case of Britain, practical involvement —Brit-
ish liaison teams were stationed at departure points in Poland through-
out 1946—. The overall impact of the official endorsement increased 
homogeneity was to accentuate antipathy towards minorities. In its ex-
treme form this antipathy was expressed through the beating, murder and 
rape of members of minority communities, which in turn engendered fear 
amongst minority communities to the extent that they were encouraged 
to leave the country, or, in the case of Belarusians in the north east, de-
clare themselves to be Polish. Thus the ‘subjective’ violence of the Polish 
population, in addition to state violence, fostered homogeneity in the im-
mediate aftermath of the war. It is estimated that in the period 1944-1946 
between 500-600 Jews were murdered (Engels 2005:425) and around 422 
Belarusians in the Białystok voivodship (Iwaniuk 2005:101).
In addition to transfers, cultural homogenisation was encouraged in 
the second half of the 1940s through the education system. Illiteracy in 
the areas inhabited by Kashubians and Mazurians was combated through 
Polish language courses. In the north east, Belarusian schools were closed, 
and in the west, the speaking of German from 17th April 1946 in public 
and at home was forbidden, with the police empowered to arrest people 
speaking German as ‘provocateurs of our national feelings’.17 Place and 
street names were changed into Polish.
Cultural homogenisation and responses to legitimacy crises
Policies of cultural homogenisation often play an important role in 
regulating and directing social anger. The foregrounding of the need for 
cultural homogenisation, as in the immediate post-war period, immedi-
ately highlights a hierarchy of cultural practices and identities, which can 
be varied according to political and social expediency.
Through the course of the Polish People’s Republic legitimacy crises 
were recurrent. Both the crises of 1956 and 1968 saw antisemitism used 
to redirect social anger, and claims by those PZPR members opposed to 
17 Cited in Naimark (2001:134).
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the leadership of the PZPR to be the repository of the ‘true’ Poland. The 
intensity of the anti-Zionist campaign in 1968, for example, can be under-
stood, at least in part, as an attempt of the PZPR leadership to reaffirm its 
Polishness in a context when fidelity to a particularly narrow definition of 
Polishness was very important. The reason for both the saliency and nar-
rowness of national identity was the fact that there was widespread senti-
ment that the PZPR was a Soviet interloper, dominated by Jews, and the 
structural limitations that allowed social anger to be expressed in the lexi-
con of nationality, but not in other registers (for example, a purely eco-
nomic register). Thus, when faced with a challenge from within the Party, 
the leadership sought to reaffirm its authority by reaffirming its Polish-
ness. It did this by targeting a group that a part of the population and the 
internal opposition saw as not truly Polish. In short, it sought to enhance 
its legitimacy by redirecting social anger, and thereby outflank the inter-
nal opposition’s nationalist agenda.18
The ‘anti-Zionist’ campaign of 1968 saw 20,000 people with Jewish 
heritage leaving Poland under duress, many having lost their jobs. Other 
defined groups were also targeted for antipathy as narrow conceptions of 
Polishness were promoted. During these crises, minority groups in the 
north-east (Belarusians) or in the west (Silesians / Germans) retreated into 
their own communities to avoid undue negative attention. The irony of 
course was that political demands for homogeneity produced its opposite, 
in that some people were seen as unable to assimilate, as each legitimacy 
crisis focused on their alleged difference and alleged simulation to Polish-
ness. The issue was not so much about cultural homogenisation as a need 
to resolve and ease the social and political tension in the body politic. 
Since the PZPR was the natural target of social anger, given its dominant 
role in society, alternative targets had to be found. Through the PRL, these 
were most frequently ‘minority’ communities, as alternatives (such as the 
‘fraternal’ USSR) could not be criticised in the Cold War context.
Post socialism
The collapse of socialist regimes across East-Central Europe in 1989 
instituted radical social, political and economic transformation, introduced 
18 For indepth analysis of 1968 in Poland see Głuchowski and Polonsky (2009).
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forms of structural violence common in liberal democratic societies and 
reconfigured the social anger regime. It also encouraged changes in the 
value systems of these states, most vividly expressed in the negative ap-
prehension and degrading of the former ‘leading’ class (Tarkowska 2009). 
And since ‘culture is about values, which include attitudes, prescribed be-
haviour and expectations as expressed in symbols and as preserved in the 
nation’s material heritage’ (Conversi 1997:1), these changes have had an 
important impact on mechanisms of cultural homogenisation.
Western European states were concerned about the revival of nation-
alism in East-Central Europe and, through a series of mechanisms, en-
couraged former communist states to adopt and promote multicultural 
policies that defended the rights of minority communities. This was done 
through several key organisations which made the good treatment of mi-
norities a condition of membership, including NATO and the EU. At the 
same time social anger had to be organised and redirected so that neo-
liberalising policies could proceed, more often than not, without popular 
endorsement.
Since minorities now enjoyed the attention of the wider European and 
transatlantic communities, they were no longer ‘official’ targets of social 
anger, though particular political actors, parts of the Church and sections 
of the populace continued to marginalise and discriminate against them. 
Rather, during the postsocialist period, the regulation of social anger has 
bifurcated: on the one hand, practices followed in the socialist period have 
been adapted and reused in the context of new social relations and, on the 
other hand, new practices which promote bourgeois values and seek to 
undermine working class cultures and traditions have taken shape. These 
two types of regulation ensure that anger is diverted away from the so-
cio-economic tensions that give rise to it, and allow neoliberalisation to 
proceed and be domesticated. New processes of cultural homogenisation 
have therefore been set in motion. But before discussing these processes I 
turn my attention to the new minority rights regime.
The new minority rights regime
The new minority rights regime describes a series of initiatives un-
dertaken in East-Central Europe to ensure that national minorities en-
joy the full benefits of citizenship like any other group within the state. 
At the international level this has included support from the Organisa-
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tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, whose 
1994 ‘Partnership for Peace Document’, for example, requires member 
states to affirm the Helsinki Final Act and all OSCE documents, includ-
ing those concerning national minority rights, and the Council of Eu-
rope, whose 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities is the most far reaching document and is important since all 
EU members have to be members of the Council of Europe. The Frame-
work convention was finally ratified by the Sejm in 2000. Article 4.2 of 
the Convention states:
The parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures 
in order to promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cul-
tural life, full and effective equality between persons belonging to a na-
tional minority and those belonging to the majority. In this respect, they 
shall take due account of the specific conditions of the persons belong-
ing to national minorities.
Polish law has also been changed so that anti-minority action can be 
discouraged and penalised. Provisions from the Framework Convention 
have been incorporated into the Polish law dealing with national minori-
ties (2005). Polish law has also recognised some of the challenges faced 
by minority communities and incorporated provisions for minorities in 
some legislative acts. This includes the Parliamentary Election Law of 
28th May 1993, which allows candidates representing a national minority 
party to enter parliament despite failing to achieve 5% of the national vote 
that other parties require.
However, despite Poland’s subscription to the new minority rights re-
gime, the ability of minorities to sustain their communities has been un-
even. The economic difficulties of north-east Poland, the lack of kin-state 
support and negative stereotyping, for example, continue to encourage 
Belarusian assimilation to the Polish mainstream (Fleming 2002). Other 
communities, such as Germans and Jews, have benefited from signifi-
cant NGO assistance and have been able to effectively communicate their 
needs at multiple levels —local, regional, state and international—.
While certain ‘historic’ minorities enjoy recognition and are able to 
mobilise government agencies to combat negative stereotyping, for in-
stance, new minorities such as immigrants from south-east Asia are not 
recognised under the minority regime as ‘national’ minorities. This has 
important implications as highlighted below.
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‘Multiculturalism’ and neoliberalism
‘Multiculturalism’ can be conceived as one plank in an Europeani-
sation agenda to bring the countries of East-Central Europe in line with 
dominant cultural practices in the West, as well as a security focused 
package to inhibit destabilising nationalist sentiments. In addition, ‘mul-
ticulturalism’ can be viewed as a method to reject the communist past and 
its values, and ‘reconnect’ with a pre-communist ‘Golden Age’ and its 
values, and to reinvigorate particular places and cities. For example, the 
former President of Łódź (1994-1998), Marek Czekalski, noted in 1996:
From the beginning as President I was searching for an idea on how 
to revitalize Łódź. Local history became the source of my inspiration. 
I have read a great number of books about old Łódź and have selected 
those elements from its history that constitute chief-markers of Łódź’s 
identity. Local traditions are one of the best assets of the city. The cur-
rent inhabitants of Łódź have inherited the memory of an urban centre 
which developed in a rapid manner, was inclusive of people of various 
nationalities, and was open toward foreign capital… I think that those 
traditions are good for our times, since, like one and a half centuries 
ago, we too are witnessing a major transformation.19
In this vision, ‘historic’ minorities are privileged even in places such 
as Łódź, where they barely exist today, (new minorities are generally mar-
ginalised), as part of an effort to reshape the image of the city and at-
tract investment and tourists in order to develop the economy. As Mich-
lic (2005:17) argues, ‘The city’s political and cultural elites have turned to 
the pre-1939 past to conceive and create a new post-communist, forward-
looking European entity, where bourgeois and multicultural narratives are 
privileged’.
These bourgeois and multicultural narratives both in Łódź and nation-
ally play a key role in the organisation of social anger and in engender-
ing processes of cultural homogenisation. On the one hand, social anger 
continues to be organised to target minority communities by key lead-
ers within culturally right leaning parties such as Law and Justice (PiS). 
19 Wojciech Górski’s interview with President Marek Czekalski «Nieznana ziema», 
Magazyn Rzeczpospolitej 12 (1996): 2. Cited in Michlic 2005:10. This romanticised view 
of the past depends on the suppression of conflict both class and national, which character-
ised the emergence of Łódź as a major industrial centre within the Russian Empire.
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Negative discourses about minorities continue to circulate quite freely, 
whether in discussions about current social and economic problems, or in 
understandings of the post-war period more generally. For instance, in the 
right leaning newspaper Nasz Dziennik, the historian Jan Wysocki in 2001 
argued that the myth of Jew-Communist was, in fact, a social fact.20 Such 
views continue to have a receptive audience. On the other hand, multicul-
tural narratives, like those officially promoted in Łódź, fetishize the past 
(the past’s complexity is rarely portrayed and the real tensions between 
different groups rarely mentioned) and do not pay much attention to new 
communities in the city. So while such multicultural narratives are impor-
tant in retrieving previously sanctioned pasts, they do not at present fully 
address the rightful demands of new communities to be recognised and 
shown respect.
The current form of multiculturalism does speak loudly, however, to 
the more culturally liberal elite of Civic Platform (PO), and to more en-
lightened / politically astute members of PiS who consider the promotion 
of a particular form of multiculturalism as a means to attract investment 
and tourists, and to reframe the image of particular places in the context 
of the demands of Europeanisation (including, for example, adherence to 
the new minority rights regime). However, the promotion of multicultur-
alism produces real tensions. Social anger is still organised to target some 
minorities, but it is countered by the opposing tendency to ensure that 
‘historic’ minorities are respected. The outcome is that those communities 
that are seen to continue to vent their social anger against minorities, es-
pecially ‘historic’ minorities, are themselves targets for marginalisation by 
liberals and broad sections of the media. So while attempts to curtail xen-
ophobia are to be applauded, the current transfer of liberals’ (i.e. PO and 
its supporters) social anger to lower class communities (and football fol-
lowers) merely adds additional complexity to how and on to whom social 
anger is transferred. Discourses frame the working classes, and football 
supporters in particular, as backward and ignorant, and their contestation 
of the limited multicultural agenda (limited in the sense that neither living 
working class cultures nor the cultures of new minorities are celebrated) 
is often seen as an inherent ‘pathology’ rather than a response to a specific 
socioeconomic and sociocultural context (Podgórska, 2004).
20 See Nasz Dziennik 19/3/2001 (http://www.naszawitryna.pl/jedwabne_371.html) 
Last accessed 31/11/2011.
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Thus, the organisation of social anger in postsocialist Poland is some-
what more complex than in the socialist period; it has bifurcated. On the 
one hand, the anger of those most exposed to the harsh winds of neolib-
eral transformation are encouraged by PiS and other culturally right lean-
ing parties to redirect their anger to ‘mythical figures’ and minorities. On 
the other hand, those who have benefited from the new economic configu-
ration have responded to discourses about individual achievement and ar-
guments about the less successful having inherent problems. The less suc-
cessful are often viewed as marring the enjoyment of specific places for 
others, but they also contribute to elite worries about how Poles are per-
ceived in international contexts. The assertion that lower class xenophobia 
is an expression of their ignorance (which in turn explains their low class 
status) has been appealing. But it is clear that the bifurcation of the organ-
isation of social anger is useful in the context of neoliberalisation. It pro-
vides the winners with a convenient narrative legitimating their success, 
and provides the losers with a narrative to explain their marginalisation. 
Neither brings into question the social relations that produce and repro-
duce society’s economic arrangements and concomitant inequalities. Like 
in the socialist period, social anger is redirected. Today, it is redirected 
from the appropriate register that could encourage meaningful positive 
change and social justice.
However, there are good reasons to be optimistic. The current multi-
cultural agenda, though narrow, could fairly easily be expanded to incor-
porate respect for new minorities and living working class communities. 
Work by NGOs such as Nigdy Więcej (Never Again), which campaigns, 
amongst other activities, against racism at football matches, together with 
growing awareness amongst lower class communities of the complexity 
of Poland’s multicultural past, hinder the transfer of social anger to minor-
ity communities. Furthermore, the economic migration of over a million 
Poles to Western Europe since 2004 and their exposure to capitalism out-
side Poland has provided many with a practical education in the structural 
inequities of the capitalist mode of production. It is possible that such an 
education provides people with sufficient knowledge to resist attempts to 
redirect social anger resulting from economic inequities to minority com-
munities. This is not to underestimate the scale of the task: the wider tol-
erant impulse of multiculturalism has been fairly weak. But it may be the 
case that inhibiting anti-working class discourse will be more difficult, 
given that our current conjuncture stimulates and accentuates status and 
social insecurity.
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At the moment, however, the division of labour in organising the redi-
rection of social anger is shared by Kaczyński’s Law and Justice (PiS) and 
Tusk’s Civic Platform (PO). The former directs anger towards minorities, 
former communists, and by affirming traditional gender roles. The latter 
marginalises working class identities, solidarities and practices. Both in-
hibit the expression of class-for-itself subjectivities, and the expression of 
social anger, derived from the socio-economic configuration, in its appro-
priate register. This division of labour facilitates the advancement of neo-
liberalisation, but accommodates the very different values and attitudes to 
be found in contemporary Poland.
Cultural homogenisation: Parallels
The Polish experience of cultural homogenisation in the aftermath of 
the Second World War mirrored that experience in neighbouring countries 
of East-Central Europe – population transfers and expulsion, programmes 
encouraging assimilation, the repression of independent cultural institutions. 
However, these processes where not just restricted to the east of the Iron 
Curtain. The demand that the nation-state be congruent is a key feature of 
much of 20th century history, as Üngör (2011) shows in relation to Turkey, 
and which reached another murderous nadir in the Balkans in the 1990s. 
Physical removal of problematic groups was very much seen as a legitimate 
part of a policy mix in the 1940s, both in the West and East. The scope for 
minority communities to express themselves was very much limited – by 
social and political pressures, lack of financial wherewithal, as well as the 
nationalising impact of state education systems and military service.
More recently, the problems and limits of the current forms of multi-
culturalism in Poland are far from unique. If, as Tariq Madood (2007) has 
argued, multiculturalism is composed of three central concepts: differ-
ence, equality (in the sense that all have the same rights in law, and their 
differences and needs should be respected) and multi (in the sense that 
groups are different in different ways), then the limits of multicultural-
ism in Poland should surprise no one. There are problems on all concep-
tual levels: the recognition of difference – new minorities are barely rec-
ognised as such; equality – their needs and differences are frequently not 
respected, nor are those of working class communities (like in many other 
places); and the different ways groups are different are not fully appre-
hended, allowing for racist and classist stereotypes to be promulgated.
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Cultural homogenisation thereby proceeds, in part, in Poland and 
elsewhere (including in Britain) by limiting ‘legitimate’ differences, and 
coercing groups to conform through social (stereotypes, marginalisation) 
and economic (low wages, unemployment) pressure. In the countries of 
the European Union we may well be far from the coercive transfers of 
population and linguistic monopolies of the twentieth century, but the 
market and the need to regulate social anger ensure that some processes of 
cultural homogenisation proceed relatively unchallenged.
Conclusion
The main argument made in this paper has been that cultural homog-
enisation often functions as a means of regulating social anger. As such it 
serves to sustain the dominant social relations. In Poland and elsewhere in 
East-Central Europe ‘patriotic socialism’ played an important role in fa-
cilitating and sustaining the hegemony of various communist parties. Pe-
riodic crises of legitimacy were temporarily resolved through the redirec-
tion of social anger to minority groups and others, including ‘imperialists’ 
and the ‘bourgeoisie’, through propaganda and purges. Minority groups 
were claimed to be insufficiently Polish, and the content of Polishness, at 
least according to the PZPR/State, had a distinct workerist content. This 
increased pressure on communities to conform to the mainstream and take 
on symbols of Polishness, including language, diction, religion.
In the postsocialist period I have contended that the form of cultural 
homogenisation has changed. Limited multicultural policies coexist with 
the demand that the population subscribe to bourgeois norms and that new 
minorities ‘Polonise’. The relative complexity (compared with the social-
ist period) of the regulation of social anger can be accounted for by the 
differential impact of neoliberal economic policy and the political de-
mands that (historic) minority populations are protected.
The relevance of the Polish case to situations elsewhere is the fact that 
the relationship between neoliberal economic policy and the regime of so-
cio-cultural regulation (in East-Central Europe – the new minority rights 
regime) can have a significant impact on how social anger is managed 
and the types of cultural homogenising processes that are actually mani-
fested. The demand that the working class adopt bourgeois norms (affirm 
individualism, accept the justice of competition and the inequities of the 
labour market, etc.) is by no means confined to East-Central Europe; and 
542 Michael Fleming
Historia Contemporánea 45: 519-544
its corollary – the stereotyping, marginalisation and rejection of working 
class identities and communities —is evident in all countries undergoing 
neoliberalisation—.
Work on the issue of cultural homogenisation can be enriched by ex-
ploring the parallels, similarities, contrasts and connections between ho-
mogenisation taking place in different registers —national, ethnic, class, 
for example—. In mid-twentieth century East-Central Europe, the costs of 
‘national’ homogenisation were high. Today, the costs of ‘class’ homoge-
nisation have yet to be calculated, though, as scholars ranging from David 
Ost (2005) to Chantel Mouffe (2004) have reminded us, the inability to 
express social anger in its appropriate (economic) register encourages il-
liberality in the political culture, not to mention the unseen costs of neo-
liberal structural violence (underemployment, unemployment, differential 
life expectancies between classes, new geographies of alienation and sui-
cide). One of the key theorists of nationalism reminded us over a decade 
ago in a different context ‘that classes without ethnicity are blind; ethnic-
ity without class empty’ (Gellner 1998:61). It remains as important as ever 
to explore the mutual relations between national, ethnic and class produc-
tion, reproduction and homogenisation.
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